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Abstract-This paper proposes a transformation scheme for 
rendering the asymmetric watermarking technique into its 
asymmetric version. The asymmetric technique uses secret 
watermark as private key and public watermark as public key. 
The public watermark has a normal distribution and the 
private watermark is a linear combination of the public 
watermark and a secret sequence. The detection process is 
implemented by correlation test between the public watermark 
and the received image. The scheme is used to transform Barni 
Algorithm, a symmetric watermarking technique, into a 
asymmetric version. Experiments showed that the asymmetric 
technique was proved as robust as its symmetric version 
against some typical image processing schemes. 
Keywords- asymmetric watermarking, Barni Algorithm, 
transformation, correlation. 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
igital watermarking has been used widely as a tool for 
protecting copyright of digital multimedia data (e.g 
images) [1, 2]. Many digital watermarking techniques for 
still images have been proposed [1-3]. The particular 
problem with the state-of-the-art watermarking techniques is 
that the majority of these schemes are symmetric: 
watermark embedding and detection use the same key. The 
symmetric watermarking scheme has a security problem: 
once attacker knows the secret key, the watermark not only 
can be detected, but it can be easily estimated and removed 
from the multimedia data completely and thereby defeat the 
goal of copyright protection.         
A solution to solve the problem is the asymmetric 
watermarking scheme, in which different key(s) are used for 
watermark embedding and detection. An asymmetric 
watermarking system uses the private key to embed a 
watermark and the public key to verify the watermark. 
Anybody who knows the public key could detect the 
watermark, but the private key cannot be deduced from the 
public key. Also, knowing the public key does not enable an 
attacker to remove the watermark [3].  
Review of several existing asymmetric watermarking 
techniques can be found in [3].  The asymmetric techniques 
proposed until now can be classified into two categories [8]. 
The first category is watermark-characteristics-based-
method where the watermark is the signals which have  
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special characteristics such as periodicity. The other is 
transform-based-method to make a public key from a given 
private key by a proper transform. Legendre-sequence-key 
et al. [5] belong to the first category, whereas Hartung and 
Girod‘s [6] and Gui [7] techniques belong to the second 
category.  
Many symmetric watermarking techniques have been 
proposed and some of them have good results in robustness 
and imperceptibility. Thus we have an idea to derive a 
symmetric watermarking technique into its asymmetric 
version, because designing a new asymmetric watermarking 
technique may need intensive effort and time. In this paper, 
we contribute to propose a transformation scheme which can 
be used to derive the symmetric technique into its 
asymmetric version. We choose a classical symmetric 
watermarking technique which has good robustness and 
imperceptibility, i.e. Barni Algorithm [9]. We use the 
scheme to derive an asymmetric version of Barni Algorithm 
II. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In several symmetric techniques, the secret key is the 
watermarks itself where they have the normal distribution. 
In asymmetric version of the symmetric technique, the 
private key and the public key is referred as the private 
watermark (Ws) and the public watermark (Wp) 
respectively. The public watermark should have a 
correlation with the private watermark, because the 
detection is implemented by using correlation test between 
the public watermark and the received image.  
In our scheme we map the symmetry method into the 
asymmetry version. Based on the compatibility between 
symmetric and asymmetric watermarking method, then in 
the mapping no change in the watermark embedding 
algorithm. Watermark embedding on the asymmetric 
version is same as the original method (symmetric), but  
watermark detection algorithm is a slight change. The 
change is in the reference watermark used in correlation test. 
In the symmetric method correlation test performed between 
the received image and original watermark, then in the 
asymmetry version correlation test is performed by the 
received image and the public watermark 
A new process added to the mapping is a transformation of a 
private watermark to produce a public watermark. The  
public watermark Wp is generated by the transformation f to 
the private watermark Ws,  
Wp = f(Ws )   (1) 
Fig.1 shows the transformation diagrams. The 
transformation f is a one-way function, so that 
D 
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computationally almost impossible to derive private 
watermark from the corresponding public watermark. One-
way nature of this property is important to provide security 
on asymmetric watermarking method. The Function f is core 
process of transformation the symmetric watermarking 
method into its asymmetric version. 
fWs Wp
 
Fig. 1. Transformation of the private watermark to the public watermark 
We design both of watermarks to have normal distribution, 
as the choice of this distribution gives resilient performance 
against collusion attack [1]. We use a concept in statistics to 
design a function f.  
In statistics, if we add two or more random variables as a 
linear combination where each of them has normal 
distribution, then the result has normal distribution too. Let 
X be a sequence with mean 1 and variance 1
2
 and Y be 
sequence that independent from X with mean 2 and 
variance 2
2
. A combination linear of X and Y is defined as 
Z = aX + bY where a and b is parameters. Sequence Z has 
the mean 3 = a1 + b2 and variance 3
2
 =  a
21
2
 + b
22
2
  
[10]. 
In generating the watermarks we have to ensure that the 
combination linear is secure. It means that  the private 
watermark cannot be deduced from the public watermark. 
Furthermore, knowing the public watermark does not enable 
a user to remove the embedded watermark from the 
watermarked image. This characteristic is realized by  
adding the public watermark with a secret sequence.  
Security of this asymmetric version depend on the secret 
sequence. Let Wp be the public watermark and R be the 
secret sequence, the private watermark can be obtained by 
adding Wp and R as   
 
Ws = f(Wp, R) = 0Wp + 1R   (2) 
 
where i is a parameter in [0, 1] to control the trade off 
between the two sequences and 0 + 1 = 1. In order to make 
the sequence R is more secure, we encrypt R by a random 
permutation before adding with Wp.  Thus, eq. (2) can be 
written as 
Ws = f(Wp, R) =0Wp + 1 R
~
 (3) 
where R
~
 is encrypted version of R. Fig. 2 shows the  
process of generating the public and the private watermark.  
The private watermark Ws is embedded into the image 
according to the equation used by its symmetric technique. 
In the detector side, using the public watermark, Wp, the test 
correlation is computed to accomplish the watermark 
detection. 
Pseudo random
generator
Seed 1
Addition
Pseudo random
generator
Seed 2
Encrypt
permutation key
pW sW
R
R
~
 
Fig. 2. Generating of  the public and the private watermark 
III.   SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Because of the public watermark, detector, and  
watermarked image are publicly available (not secret), the 
attacker uses the public information to deduce the private 
watermark Ws. Such attacks are called public attack. Once 
Ws can be calculated, then Ws is removed from the 
watermarked image by performing a subtraction operation 
on watermark embedding formula (depending on methods). 
Security of this transformation scheme is based on two 
factors as follows: 
A. One-way function 
One-way functions are commonly used in cryptography to 
enhance system security. In the one-way function, 
computing to evaluate function value of the variables is 
relatively easy, but to discover variables value of the 
function value is relatively computationally difficult and 
even impossible. In Eq. (3) parameter R can be viewed as 
trapdoor, it is impossible to find Ws without knowing the 
trapdoor, because the attackers must do the inversion of the 
one-way function. The attacker knows  Wp but he (or she)  
does not know R.  Because of R
~
 is an encrypted version of  
R, the attacker must know the R before getting R
~
. 
B. Permutation 
Let the attacker knows R, next he (or she) needs to know a 
random permutation used to encrypt R. Because cardinality 
of R is n, the attacker must try n! permutation to find the 
right one. Remember that n is large enough, it is about 25% 
of original image size, so that finding the right permutation 
needs O(n!) computation. For n = 10000 as example, there 
are 10000! computation. We conclude that it is impossible 
for attackers to deduce the private watermark from these 
public information. 
IV. CASE STUDY: TRANSFORMATION OF BARNI ALGORITHM 
In this section we present derivation of a symmetric 
watermarking method into the asymmetric version based on 
transformation scheme which has been described in Section 
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II. The symmetric watermarking method is a classic method, 
i.e Barni Algorithm. 
 In Barni Algorithm, the watermark consists of a pseudo 
random sequence of M real number, W = {w(1), w(2), ..., 
w(n)}, that has a normal distribution with mean = 0 and 
variance = 1. The watermark W is inserted into selected 
DCT coefficients, V = {v(1), v(2), ..., v(n)}. The watermark 
detection is done by computing correlation between the 
selected DCT coefficients from a possibly corrupted image 
I*, i.e. V* = {v
*
(1), v
*
(2), ..., v
*
(n)}.   
In the asymmetric version of Barni Algorithm, we use two 
watermarks, the first is a private watermark, Ws = {ws(1), 
ws(2), ..., ws(M)}, that embedded into the host image and the 
second is a public watermark Wp = {wp(1), wp(2), ..., wp(n)), 
for detection phase. Both of the watermarks are generated 
by the procedure explained in Section 2. The private 
watermark is embedded into the image according to 
formula: 
vw (i) = v(i) + v(i)ws(i)  (3) 
In the detector side, using the public watermark, Wp, the 
following correlation is computed: 
)()(*
1
iwiv
n
c p
n
ii
 

  (4) 
After we set the threshold T, the watermark detection is 
finished by comparing c and a threshold. The threshold is 
depend on the received image and calculated with following 
formula:  



n
i
iv
n
T
1
* )(
3

   (5) 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
We apply our method to image watermarking by using 
MATLAB as programming tool. The test image is a 512  
512 color image ‗train‘. Size of the private watermark is n = 
16000. The watermark and the secret sequence R have a 
normal distribution with mean = 0 and variance = 1. The 
public watermark is generated by function f which has been 
explained in Section II with  0 is equal to 0.8 and 1 = 0.2.  
The embedding strength  is equal to  0.25. Histogram of 
the public watermark and the private watermark is shown in 
Fig. 3. From Fig. 2(b) we observe that shape of distribution 
graphics of  the private watermark is like a bell as common 
standard normal distributions. 
 
  
 
Fig.3. Histogram of  the private and public watermark 
Before embedding the private watermark, the original image 
is transformed from RGB to YcbCr. The watermark is 
embedded to luminance component (Y) only, and the final 
result is retransformed from YcbCr to RGB. 
Figure 4(a) shows the original image and Figure 4(b) shows 
the watermarked image (PSNR = 36.9833). Visually the 
watermarked image quality was almost identical with the 
original image. Figure 4(c) shows response of a public  
detector to 1000 random watermarks, one of them (index 
250) is a public watermark that have a correlation with the 
private watermark. Such images provide two interpretations 
[9]. The first interpretation, the response to the public 
watermark is compared with the T to decide the existence of 
the (private) watermark within the image. The second 
interpretation, if people do not know which watermark is 
embedded in the image, then response from all the public 
watermark is compared and the highest response is selected. 
Response from the public watermark is should be the 
highest compared with the others and this suggests the 
existence of a corresponding private watermark in the 
image. 
 
(a) Original image 
 
(b) Watermarked image 
 
(c) Response of public detection 
 
(c) Response of private detection 
Fig. 4.  Output of watermark embedding and detection on 
‗train‘  image . 
Figure 4(c) shows that the correlation test with the correct 
public watermark correlation value is significantly higher 
than the other. The threshold T is calculated analytically 
from equation (5) is 1.0188. In case there is no attack on the 
watermarked image, the detector gives the value c = 4.2512. 
Because c > T, it can be concluded that the image contains 
the (private) watermark. For comparison, in private 
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detection (using the private watermark on correlation test) 
gives c = 5.3251 (Fig. 4(d)). 
The next experiment was done to see robustness of the 
watermark against some non-malicious attacks, which is the 
general operations performed on image processing 
(cropping, compression, low-pass filtering, etc.). We use 
Jasc Paint Shop version 6.01 as image processing software. 
The experiments and results are explained as follows.  
V.1. Experiment 1: JPEG Compression 
We tested the robustness against JPEG compression with   
extreme compression qualitie. For compression quality 6%, 
the watermark can be detected  succesfully (c = 1.1727, T = 
0.9602). For comparison, in private detection (using the 
private watermark) gives c = 1.4632). See Fig. 5 
 
 
 
 
(a) JPEG image with low compression quality 
 
(b) Response of public detection 
 
(c) Response of private detection 
Fig 5. JPEG compression with compression quality 6%. The 
watermark can be detected 
V.2  Experiment 2: Dithering 
We convert the watermarked image to a binary image by 
dithering operation. It means plenty of gray-level 
information lost. It is shown in Fig. 6 that the watermark 
still can be detected. The response to the right watermark is 
largest among the response to all the watermarks (c = 
3.4352, T = 2.4982). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. (a) Dithering.  (b) Response of public detector  
V.3. Experiment 2: Image Cropping 
Image cropping will remove some watermark information. 
In our simulation, we cut unimportant part from the 
watermarked image (about 50%), the missing part of the 
image is replaced with black pixels (see Figure 7a). In fact, 
we can always correctly detect the watermark because the 
correlation value (c = 2.1752, T = 0.8579) is still greater 
significantly than the others. For comparison, in private 
detection gives c = 2.7349. 
 
(a) Cropped image 
 
(b) Image after histogram 
equalization 
 Fig. 7.  Image cropping and histogram equalization 
V.4.  Experiment 4: Histogram Equalization 
The watermarked image is adjusted so that distribution of 
gray-level is uniform by using histogram equalization 
operation (a typical low-pass filtering operation, see Fig. 
7(b)). Experiment shows that the watermark can be detected 
where c = 6.4877, T = 1.2269. For comparison, in  in private 
detection gives c = 8.1186. 
 
V.5.  Experiment 5: Resizing 
The watermarked image is resized until 50% of the original 
size. Experiment shows that the watermark still can be 
detected. For resizing up to 200% of the original image, the 
watermark still can be detected well (we found that c = 
1.8030, T = 0.4520). For comparison, in  in private detection 
gives c = 2.2571 
VI.   DISCUSSION 
Based on a series of experiments that have been done for  
asymmetric version of Barni algorithm, it has achieved some 
results which are analyzed as follows. 
A series of experimental results show that the asymmetric 
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version remains robust to typical image processing 
operations like JPEG compression, histogram equalization,  
dithering, cropping, and resizeng. Detector response of  
asymmetric method is not much different to original  
symmetric version, and correlation values yielded by 
detector not differ significantly 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper a scheme for deriving a symmetric 
watermarking technique into its asymmetric technique has 
been proposed. For test case, Barni algorithm, a classical 
image watermarking, is successfully transformed into an 
asymmetric watermarking technique. This technique uses 
two watermarks: the first watermark is a public watermark 
used for public detection, and the second watermark is a 
private watermark that has a correlation to the public 
watermark. The private watermark is a linear combination of 
the public watermark and an encrypted version of a secret 
sequence. Security of this asymmetric technique is based on 
one-way function with trapdoor and the difficulty of finding 
the secret sequence where it needs O(n!) computation. 
Simulations against various attacks confirmed that this 
asymmetric technique is as robust as its symmetric version 
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